Thailand's defense in the Proceedings was, in summary, as follows:
(1) Annex I was not the work of, and was only prepared by one party to, the Mixed Commission and thus was not binding on it; (2) the map contained a material error as the Commission did not have power to deviate from the watershed in such a significant margin; 11 (3) it never accepted the map or the frontier depicted on it such that it was bound or, alternatively, if it had accepted the map, it did so on a mistaken belief that the map line was drawn to correspond with the watershed line. In its counter-claim, Thailand claimed territorial sovereignty over the Temple. 12 The ICJ relevantly ruled in the Proceeding:
(1) although the preparation (the drawing) and publication of the map were not approved by the Mixed Commission, Annex I was based on the work of the Mixed Commission and was valid. According to the ICJ, the essential question in the Proceedings was "whether the Parties did adopt the Annex I map, and the line indicated on it, as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation of the frontier in the region of Preah Vihear, thereby conferring on it a binding character." 13 (2) Even if there was an error in the preparation of Annex I, Thailand had adopted Annex 1. According to the ICJ, it is an "established rule of law that a plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible." 14 208 gps¤pvdi 11 Cambodia maintained that the boundary line of the area on Annex I map is the correct watershed, "Reply by Mr.
Acheson"in 2 I.C.J Pleadings, 466-472. Importantly, a report by Thai-French Officers, Sanam Rithikray and Henri Dessemond, of Mixed Commission who placed the boundary stone pillar at Kel Pass, clearly reported that the boundary line was not running along the edge of the Preah Vihear escarpment. 16 The ICJ rejected the Thai claim of sovereignty over the Temple. It was contradictory for Thailand to argue on the one hand that the boundary had not been determined and, on the other hand, that it had acted in a way that resulted in Cambodia relinquishing sovereignty. The implication of the Thai argument on the sovereignty claim was that it believed that boundary line was correct. In such circumstances, the presence of Thai authorities was a deliberate violation of the Cambodia's sovereignty. Thailand could not have both ways. 17 By its Note of 6 July 1962 to the Secretary General of the United Nations (the 1962 Note), Thailand decided, with reservation, to "comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice." 18 All the successive Thai governments "accepted"the ICJ ruling. 19 �the ICJ did not determine the land boundary; and �the matter of the land boundary is yet to be determined in international law. 21 In relation to the first point, Thailand referred to Cambodia's initial submissions in the Proceedings where Cambodia sought determination of the following issues:
(1) that [Thailand] is under an obligation to withdraw the detachments of armed forces it has stationed since 1954 in the ruins of the Temple of Preah Vihear; (2) That the territorial sovereignty over the Temple of Preah Vihear belongs to [Cambodia] .
Based on these initial submissions, Thailand asserts that the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Proceedings was restricted to determination of sovereignty over the Temple itself. Thailand refers to the ICJ's Judgment of 15 June 1962 (Merits) where the ICJ stated, in part: "the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court in confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear." 22 Thailand further relies on the ICJ's statement that: "Cambodia's first and second Submissions, calling for pronouncement on the legal status of the Annex I Map and on the frontier line in the disputed region, can be entertained only to the extent that they give expression to the grounds, and not as claims to be deal."
In relation to the second point made by Thailand asserts that the ICJ had regard to the issue of the frontier line only to determine the narrower dispute of territorial sovereignty over the Temple.
Finally, in relation to its assertion in the 2008 Letter that "[t]he precise location of the boundary line is still to be determined,"Thailand asserts:
Cambodia's first and second Submissions, calling for pronouncement on the legal status of the Annex I Map and on the frontier line in the disputed region, can be entertained only to the extent that they give expression to the grounds, and not as claims to be deal with in the operative provisions of the judgment. 24 The crux of Thailand's argument is that Annex I is not an integral part of the Treaty, the ICJ did not give Annex I legal status and, in any event, the basis for demarcation is not Annex I but the Treaty "which defines the boundary line in this area along the watershed line." 25
The ICJ had jurisdiction over the issue of the land boundary
The ICJ did have jurisdiction over both the territorial and boundary questions and the boundary was clearly determined by the ICJ.
Although the Terms of Reference in the Proceedings referred to the territorial sovereignty dispute, this is the case that can be defined as relating to both boundary and territorial disputes. 26 This is because, Cambodia based its territorial (sovereignty) claim on Annex I map -the boundary map made pursuant to the 1904 Treaty 27 -and the two questions are, effectively one and the same. 28 In a similar ICJ case prior to the Proceedings, the Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium vs. Netherlands, 1959), by a special Agreement, the ICJ was requested to determine "sovereignty over the plots shown in the survey and known from 1838 to 1843 as Nos. 91 and 92, Section A, Zondereygen." 29 Despite the application requesting a determination on sovereignty, the ICJ treated the issue as a boundary dispute. At issue was a map, which was incorporated in the relevant Boundary Convention by reference. The ICJ ruled that the map and boundary line depicted therein were valid. 30 In the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso vs. Mali, 1986), 31 the Chamber of the ICJ was asked to determine a frontier dispute. Besides the fact that it was clear in the Memorial submitting the case to the ICJ that the parties asked the Chamber to determine the boundary dispute, there was an issue raised by the parties regarding the classification of boundary disputes and attribution of territory/territorial sovereignty disputes. The Chamber noted that the two disputes are only different in degree and not in nature. 32 Generally, arbitral and judicial decisions of international tribunals suggest that territorial and border disputes are interdependent. 33 According to one writer: "Sometimes a claim to territory involves a precise claim to given boundaries; sometimes boundary definition has been a subsequent exercise and one may be able legitimately to distinguish between the claim to the territory and the claim to the boundaries which define it" 34 Boundary and territorial disputes therefore form "part of the larger question of territorial sovereignty 35 "The difference between the two concepts is insignificant as "border disputes and territorial disputes both involve, at their core, sovereignty over disputed land." 36 Importantly, in the Frontier Dispute case the ICJ ruled that "the effect of any judicial tt¤upftw¤P¤AQIIXB f¤hnpejo¤ptjujpo 213
decision rendered either in a dispute as to attribution of territory [territorial dispute] or in a delimitation [boundary] dispute is necessarily to establish a frontier" 37 . In the Island of Palmas case 38 the parties' agreed terms of the reference were for the arbitrator to determine the territorial dispute. The arbitrator proceeded to make reference to rules governing both the territorial and frontier disputes. The two categories of disputes are interdependent. 39 In the Terms of Reference in the Proceedings, Cambodia referred to "territorial sovereignty," 40 but the substance of its case included both territorial/sovereignty and boundary claims. The question for the ICJ was whether or not Annex I was valid. At the beginning of its Judgment, the ICJ laid out the subject of dispute to be determined: " This is a dispute about territorial sovereignty."In order to determine the issue of territorial sovereignty, however, the ICJ went on to say that "the Court must have regard to the frontier line between the two States" 41 (1) To adjudicate and declare that the map of Dangrek sector (Annex I to the Memorial of Cambodia) was drawn up and published in the name and on behalf on the Mixed Delimitation Commission set up by the Treaty of 13 February 1904, that it sets forth the decisions taken by the said Commission and that, by reason of that fact and also of the subsequent agreements and conduct of the Parties, it presents a treaty character; (2) To adjudicate and declare that the frontier line between Cambodia and Thailand, in the disputed region in the neighborhood of the Temple of Preah Vihear, is that which is marked on the map of the Commission of Delimitation between Indochina and Siam (Annex I map to the Memorial of Cambodia); (3) To adjudicate and declare that the Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under the sovereignty of
[Cambodia]; (4) To adjudicate and declare that [Thailand] is under an obligation to withdraw the detachments of armed forces it has stationed since 1954, in Cambodian territory, in the ruins of the Temple of Preah Vihear; (5) To adjudicate and declare that sculptures, stelae, fragments of monument, sandstone model and ancient pottery which have been removed from the Temple by the Thai authorities since 1954 are to be returned to [Cambodia] by [Thailand] mention the Temple, the ICJ concluded that it "can only give a decision as the sovereignty over the Temple area after having examined what the frontier line is." 42 It is clear from these statements of the ICJ and Cambodia's Application and Memorial that the ICJ had jurisdiction over both the territorial (sovereignty) and boundary disputes. There was no distinction between the two categories of disputes. To determine the territorial sovereignty is to decide on the boundary line. 43 The expansion of Cambodia's claims from two claims/submissions originally made under its Application and Memorial (which focused on sovereignty over the Temple and removal of Thai troops from the Temple) to five claims/submissions under the title of Final Submissions was allowed by the ICJ. 44 The ICJ accepted all five Submissions. The First and Second Submissions which, in summary, requested the ICJ to determine the validity of Annex I and to adjudicate and declare that the frontier line was that on Annex I, were used as basis or grounds for reasoning in the Judgment but not in the operative provisions because this was not necessary. This is because the ICJ found that Annex I was valid for reasons other than that it had been published by and issued in the name of the Mixed Commission. 45 In rejecting Thailand's argument that the fourth submission in the Final Submissions (regarding return of sculptures and other items taken from the Temple) was too late to be determined, the ICJ held that, like the submission that Thai troops be withdrawn, it was "implicit in, and consequential on, the claim of sovereignty itself." 46
The Judgment did determine the location of the boundary
Annex I, as conceded by Prince Vongsamahip Jayankura, Agent of the Royal Government of Thailand and another Counsel for Thailand, was " the central point of the case." 47 In fact, the main question on which Thailand asked its lawyers for legal advice tt¤upftw¤P¤AQIIXB f¤hnpejo¤ptjujpo 215 in 1959 was "whether a map or a treaty definition of a boundary would prevail." 48 One of Thailand's former lawyers puts forward what appears to be Thailand's reasoning in the 2008 Letter. In Guenter Weissberg's article "Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes" 49 he states: "the Judgment did not determine the frontier in the disputed area and left the precise line of the watershed on the Preah Vihear promontory unclear. Indeed, the Court did not find necessary 'to consider whether, at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped does in fact correspond to the true watershed line in this vicinity, or did so correspond in 1904-1908, or, if not, how the watershed line in fact run' ... and thus failed to pass on one of the Cambodian submissions' "In support of this, Weissberg went on to cite the dissenting opinion of minority Judge Percy who stated that it was "hardly... possible... to pronounce in favor of the line of Annex I in the absence of a determination of the extent to which Annex I does or does not in fact conform to the stipulations contained in Article I of the Treaty itself." 50 The fact of the matter is the Court did determine all of the five submissions. The first and second submissions were dealt with in the reasoning part of the Judgment and the third-fifth submissions were dealt in the operative portion of the Judgment. Furthermore, Weissberg did not cite the Judgment completely or correctly. He misleadingly omitted to refer to the following:
"the indication of the line of the watershed in Article I of the 1904 Treaty was itself no more than an obvious and convenient way of describing a frontier line objectively, though in general terms. There is, however, no reason to think that the Parties attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as such, as compared with overriding importance, in the interests of finality, of adhering to the map line as eventually delimited and accepted by them. The Court, therefore, feels bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to pronounce in favor of the line as mapped in the disputed area" 51 The above paragraph, consequentially, is followed by the paragraph cited by Weissberg (and Thailand in the 2008 Letter) 52 : Both paragraphs must be considered and read together to understand the Judgment "Given the grounds on which the Court bases its decision, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether, at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped does in fact correspond to the true watershed line in this vicinity, or did so correspond to in 1904-1908, or, if not, how the watershed line in fact runs."
Because the boundary location depicted on Annex I has been accepted, there was no need for the ICJ, as Professor Victor Prescott points out, to "pronounce whether the boundary around the northern perimeter of the Temple coincided with the watershed because the matter was decided before this question needed an answer 53 "Another scholar, Keith Highet concludes:
"The Court held that since the location indicated in the map had been accepted, it was unnecessary to examine the physical location of boundary as derived from the terms of the Treaty (i.e., the location of the "watershed"line. The intricate and technical questions of geography and geomorphology intended to support the description in the Treaty were therefore never resolved by the Court since its legal determination in the case made it unnecessary to reach those facts." 54 The Judgment held that Thailand had already accepted Annex I in 1908-1909 as representing the result of delimitation, and had recognized the map line as being the frontier line. 55 According to the ICJ, "[a]s a result, the map entered the treaty settlement and became 'an integral part of it.'" 56 Even if the map line diverged from the watershed tt¤upftw¤P¤AQIIXB f¤hnpejo¤ptjujpo 217 line, Annex I was accepted by both governments. 57 The effect of the decision, as Weissberg points out: "...is that in the interest of certainty, and finality of frontiers, an unsigned map in derogation of a treaty provision supersedes the text as a matter of treaty interpretation." 58 Criticizing Cambodia's addition of new (first and second and fifth) Submissions, Thai Counsel Seni Pramoj put forward that, "since Annex I is but one in a series of maps some of which were not superseded by the Treaty 1907, it would be easy to argue forwards that if the Court pronounces judgment on the basis of Annex I, the Court must necessarily uphold the frontier line as drawn on the other maps in the same series as well." 59 By implication, the ICJ did uphold the frontier line on the rest of the maps. 60 
According to the ICJ:
"In general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the line so established can, at any moment, and on the basis of a continuously available process, be called in question, and its rectification claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by reference to a clause on the parent treaty is discovered. Such a process could indefinitely, and finality would never be reached so long as possible errors still remained to be discovered. Such a frontier, so far from being stable, would be completely precarious. It must be asked why the parties in this case provided for a delimitation, instead of relying on the Treaty clause indicating that the frontier line in the region would be the watershed. There are boundary treaties which do no more than refer to a watershed line, or to a crest line, and which make no provision for any delimitation in addition. This could only have been because they regarded a watershed indication as insufficient by itself to achieve certainty and finality. It is precisely to achieve this that delimitation and map lines are resorted to." 61
Ratio Decidendi and Dispositif of the ICJ Judgment
Thailand's statement in the 2008 Letter that "[i]n the operative provisions of the Judgment, the Court did not address the question of the boundary line in any way" 62 suggests that the ICJ's ruling in the reasoning part (ratio decidendi), which principally dealt with the validity of Annex I, is not binding. This is not the case. As set out above, in its reasoning, the ICJ upheld and pronounced the legal status of Annex I as being a valid and legitimate and as an integral part of the Treaty : "The Court, therefore, feels bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to pronounce in favor of the line as mapped in the disputed area." 63 It is a principle of international law that dispositif or operative provisions and the reasons in the reasoning portion of the judgment have binding force so long as the reasons do not go beyond the scope of the operative part. 64 In its first case, Pious Fund Case (1902), the Permanent Court of Arbitration established this rule of international law. It held that:
"...all parts of the judgment or decree concerning the points debated in the litigation enlighten and mutually supplement each other, and .. they all serve to render precise the meaning and the bearing of the dispositif [operative portion of the judgment] and to determine the points upon which there is res judicata and which thereafter cannot be put in question." 65 This international law rule was also articulated by the predecessor to the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in Polish Postal Service in Danzig case (1925) where it held that it is perfectly true that all the parts of a judgment concerning the points in dispute explain and complete each other and are to be taken into account in order to determine the precise meaning and scope of the operative portion. In that case, the Permanent Court said: "it is certain that the reasons contained in a decision, at least in so far as they go beyond the scope of the operative part, have no binding force as between the Parties concerned" 66 The Permanent Court also "recognized that it was impossible to vote upon the operative part of a decision and not upon the grounds thereof; for, under Article 56 of the Statute, the statement of reasons and the operative clauses are regarded an indivisible whole." 67 tt¤upftw¤P¤AQIIXB f¤hnpejo¤ptjujpo 219
In the words of the ICJ President in South West Africa case "the dispositif cannot be disemboweled from the Court's opinion as expressed in its motivation [reasoning part]
[because] the content of the judgment must be obtained from reading together the decision and the reasons upon which it is based." 68 This approach was adopted by the ICJ in the United Kingdom v. French Case. 69 The United Kingdom filed an Interpretation Application with the Court of Arbitration of the Court's decision of 30 June 1977 because there were inconsistencies between the ICJ's reasoning (which contained the coordinates defining the boundary in question) and dispositif (containing the application principles of law to the case). The parties differed on the scope of res judicata. France argued that res judicata only contained in the dispositif. The UK challenged the res judicata principle by pushing to have the reasoning part prevail over the dispositif. It "identified passages of the body of the Decision itself constitute essential elements of the Award which equally have the authority of res judicata and... form an integral part of the Court's response to the question specified in Article 2 -issue put before the Court." 70 The ICJ upheld the UK's contentions. It said that it is "...well settled that in international proceedings the authority of res judicata, that is the binding force of the decision, attaches in principle only to the provisions of its dispositif and not it reasoning. In the opinion of the Court, it is equally clear that having regard to the close links that exist between the reasoning of a decision and the operative provisions of its dispositif, recourse may in principle be had to the reasoning in order to elucidate the meaning and scope of the dispositif." 71 That is true because the provisions in the operative part often are the non-selfexplanatory result of a compromise which has been reached only by formulating the operative part in vague and imprecise terms. 72 In Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia vs. Libray), Tunisia attempted to take advantage of the difference between the Court's reasoning and the dispositif : the former suggested coordinates for a change in direction of the Tunisian coast, the latter did not include those coordinates. Tunisia therefore argued that the coordinates did not form part of what was res judicata. The Court held that the whole judgment was binding, not just the dispositif:
"The terms of the Court's Judgment are definitive and binding... They stand, not as something proposed to the Parties by the Court, but as something established by the Court." 73 However, following the Continental Shelf Case, if the "express findings"of the ICJ in the reasoning portion constituted a condition essential to its decision, they are to be included among the points settled with binding force. 74 Thus without the considering the "express findings"in the Proceedings, including regarding the validity of Annex I and its being an integral part of the Treaty, then the pronouncement of the ICJ in the operative provisions that "The Temple of Preah Vihear is situated in territory under sovereignty of Cambodia"would make no sense without consideration of how the ICJ reached this conclusion. 75 The interlocking of the express findings and operative provision is essential, as the ICJ held that: "To decide this question of territorial sovereignty, the Court must have regard to the frontier line between the two states." 76 It would therefore be incorrect to suggest that the operative parts are alone binding in an ICJ judgment. Contrary to Thailand's assertions, the express findings in the reasoning part of the judgment in the Proceedings are not merely part of the reasoning; rather they are themselves conclusive findings of the ICJ. 77
The location of the land boundary has been determined in international law
As discussed above, the location of the Cambodian-Thai boundary, especially the Temple section as depicted on Annex I, has been determined by international law. The finality and stability of the boundary were confirmed as such by the ICJ in the Proceedings 1962. 78 Further in 2000, Thailand has recognized Annex I 79 and thus the tt¤upftw¤P¤AQIIXB f¤hnpejo¤ptjujpo 221 location of the boundary thereon and now seeks to resile from this acceptance.
A. Notification of compliance. Note stated that Thailand expressed "its disagreement with the... decision of the Court on the ground that, in its opinion, the decision goes against the express terms of the relevant provisions of the 1904 and 1907 treaties and is contrary to the principles of law and justice."The 1962 Note went on to state a reservation: 80 It is interesting to note that when the UN Secretary General and Cambodian Permanent Representative at the UN originally received the 1962 Note, no map was annexed and there was no suggestion in the 1962 Note that it contained an annex. A map, as shown in figure 2 below, only appeared as an annex to the 1962 Note when it was later published in the Foreign Affair Bulletin 81 The document was not published in UN official documents, nor does it exist in the UN databases. 82 The reason that the map US Statement Department. 86 It did not state purpose of it, i.e. demand a revision under Article 61 of the ICJ Statute or request an interpretation under Article 60 of the Statute. Further, it is invalid because it was not addressed to the court (the ICJ) which rendered the judgment. 87 In any event, the 10 year statute of limitations for making a revision application has long ago expired. 88 
Redress for failure to comply and State responsibility
By sending its armed forces to attack and invade region of the Temple on 15 July 2008 89 and occupy Cambodian territory, Thailand violated Article 2(4) of the Charter of United Nations. Member states have the "duty to give effect to the Judgment of the Court' by voiding superficial implementation or circumventing the Judgment." 90 Article 94 (1) of Charter of United Nations provides that "Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." 91 Article 94(2) of the same Charter stipulates "If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." 92 By deliberately avoiding to comply fully with ICJ judgment, Thailand has committed a breach of its undertaking under this provision the effect of which is a violation of the Charter of United Nations. 93 Cambodia has recourse to the Security Council for an appropriate measures.
Since "the unlawful occupation of part of the territory of another state or stationing armed forces in another state without its consent"is a wrong act 94 Cambodia also claim for reparation for moral and material injuries caused in the form of restitution, compensation. 95 
The Memorandum of Understanding of 2000 on Demarcation
Article 1 of the Treaty relates to delimitation 96 and Article 3 of the Treaty relates to demarcation. 97 The boundary had been delimited and (albeit sparsely) demarcated. 98 Negotiations to resolve the dispute and to set up a Cambodian-Thai Mixed Commission started in 1954. 99 At the end of 1958, the negotiations broke down over the proposed terms of reference to be used by the Mixed Commission. 100 The apparent reason of the breakdown was:
"Thailand accepted 'the treaties and the Protocols'annexed, but would not accept the use of the words 'documents annexed,'because these words had a wider meaning and might refer to a sketch which has no accuracy. Cambodia insisted on the 'documents annexed' ... Therefore no agreement could be reached" 101 The negotiations restarted in 1997. 102 In July 1999, the negotiations stalled because Thailand insisted all the documents of the 10-year survey and demarcation works starting from 1909 to be used by the Mixed Commission should be the basis for the boundary demarcation. Cambodia insisted that only the maps annexed to the Treaty and the Treaty of 1907 and documents relevant to the application of these treaties be used as the basis 103 .
Cambodia's insistence prevailed. On 7 June 2000, a MoU was signed ad referendum. In a joint press release, the parties explained the purpose of the MoU:
"MoU aims at surveying and demarcating the land boundary between the two countries and shall be jointly conducted on the basis of Franco-Siamese Convention of 1904 and the Treaty of 1907 and Protocol annexed to the said Agreements and the Maps of the Franco-Siamese Commission of Delimitation." 104 On 14 June 2000 the MoU was signed by both States. 105 The MoU is an agreement to demarcate the boundary between the two states. In addition to the survey and demarcation to be jointly conducted in accordance with the Treaty and the Treaty of 1907, Article 1(c) stipulates that reliance is also to be placed on:
Memorandum of Understanding of 2000 as the basis for demarcation." 108
Conclusion
By the Proceedings, the ICJ determined conclusively the boundary between Cambodia and Thailand, including the area surrounding the Temple. Thailand has accepted the ICJ decision in the Proceedings and is obligated under international law to comply fully with that judgment. It has further accepted under the MoU that demarcation will proceed on the basis of Annex I, among other documents and maps. Thailand's current conduct could constitute a threat to the world peace, Cambodia should seek appropriate measures and enforcement of the judgment in the Proceedings under Article 94 of the UN Charter. 109
